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Abstract- Various low-latency anonymous communication systems such as Tor and Anonymizer have been designed to
provide anonymity service for users. In order to hide the communication of users, most of the anonymity systems pack the
application data into equal-sized cells. Via extensive experiments on Tor, we found that the size of IP packets in the Tor
network can be very dynamic because a cell is an application concept and the IP layer may repack cells. Based on this
finding, we investigate a new cell-counting-based attack against Tor, which allows the attacker to confirm anonymous
communication relationship among users very quickly. In this attack, by marginally varying the number of cells in the target
traffic at the malicious exit onion router, the attacker can embed a secret signal into the variation of cell counter of the target
traffic. The embedded signal will be carried along with the target traffic and arrive at the malicious entry onion router. Then,
an accomplice of the attacker at themalicious entry onion router will detect the embedded signal based on the received cells
and confirm the communication relationship among users. We have implemented this attack against Tor, and our
experimental data validate its feasibility and effectiveness. There are several unique features of this attack. First, this attack
is highly efficient and can confirm very short communication sessions with only tens of cells. Second, this attack is effective,
and its detection rate approaches 100% with a very low false positive rate. Third, it is possible to implement the attack in a
way that appears to be very difficult for honest participants to detect.

Houmansadret al. proposed a nonblind network flow
watermarking scheme called RAINBOW for stepping
stone detection.

EXISTING SYSTEM:
Most existing approaches are based on traffic
analysis. Passive traffic analysis technique will
record the traffic passively and identify the
correlation between sender’s outbound traffic and
receiver’s inbound traffic based on statistical
measures. This type of technique requires a relatively
long period of traffic observation for a reasonable
detection rate. The idea is to actively introduce
special signals into the sender’s outbound traffic with
the intention of recognizing the embedded signal at
the receiver’s inbound traffic.Encryption does not
work, since packet headers still reveal a great deal
about users.
Disadvantage:
¾ Encryption does not work, since packet
headers still reveal a great deal about users.
PROPOSED SYSTEM:

Advantage:
¾ Active watermarking technique can reduce
attack lasting time.
¾ Improve attack success rate and has recently
received more attention.
IMPLEMENTATION:
Implementation is the stage of the project when the
theoretical design is turned out into a working
system. Thus it can be considered to be the most
critical stage in achieving a successful new system
and in giving the user, confidence that the new
system will work and be effective.
The implementation stage involves careful planning,
investigation of the existing system and it’s
constraints on implementation, designing of methods
to achieve changeover and evaluation of changeover
methods.

In this project, we focus on the active watermarking
technique, which has been active in the past few
years. proposed a flow-marking scheme based on the
direct sequence spread spectrum technique by
utilizing a pseudo-noise code. By interfering with the
rate of a suspect sender’s traffic and marginally
changing the traffic rate, the attacker can embed a
secret spread-spectrum signal into the target traffic.
The embedded signal is carried along with thetarget
traffic from the sender to the receiver, so the
investigator can recognize the corresponding
communication relationship, tracing the messages
despite the use of anonymous networks. However, in
order to accurately confirm the anonymous
communication relationship of users, the flowmarking scheme needs to embed a signal modulated
by a relatively long length of PN code, and also the
signal is embedded into the traffic flow rate variation.

MODULES:
1.
2.
3.

Data Transmission,
Components of Tor,
Cells at Onion Routers,

Data Transmission:
In Tor, a maintains a connection to other on demand.
The uses a way of source routing and chooses several
from the locally cached directory, downloaded from
the directory caches. The number of the selected is
referred as the path length. We use the default path
length of three as an example. The iteratively
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basedattack,we let the client download 30 files in our
experiments. The size of each file is around 10 MB.
At the exit onion router, we generate a random signal
with 100 b. When the target traffic from server
Bobarrivesattheexitonionrouter,wevarythenumberofc
ells in the circuit and embed the signal into the
variation of the cell count during a short period in the
target traffic. At the entry onionrouter,the
cellsinthecircuitqueuearerecordedinthelog, and the
recovery mechanisms will be applied to recognize the
embeddedsignal.Inaddition,wechosedifferentthreshol
dsand types in our recovery mechanism.

establishes circuits across the Tor network and
negotiates a symmetric key with each, one hop at a
time, as well as handles the streams from client
applications. The side of the circuit connects to the
requested destinations and relays the data. We now
illustrate the procedure that theestablishes a circuit
and downloads a file from the server.
Components of Tor:
Onion routers are special proxies that relay the
application data. In Tor, transport-layer security
connections are used for the overlay link encryption
between two onion routers. The application data is
packed into equal-sized cells.They hold onion router
information such as public keys for onion routers.
Directory authorities hold authoritative information
on onion routers, and directory caches download
directory information of onion routers from
authorities.
Cells at Onion Routers:
To begin with, the onion router receives the data from
the connection on the given port A. After the data is
processed by protocols, the data will be delivered into
the buffer of the connection. When there is pending
data in the buffer, the read event of this connection
will be called to read and process the data. The
connection read event will pull the data from the
buffer into the connection input buffer. Each
connection input buffer is implemented as a linked
list with small chunks. The data is fetched from the
head of the list and added to the tail. After the data in
the TLS buffer is pulled into the connection input
buffer, the connection read event will process the
cells from the connection input buffer one by one.

Detection
rateversusdelayinterval
Therateisfordetecting onebit).

(Note:

Detection rateversusdelayinterval
andsignallengthwithdetection scheme1(Note: Therateisfor
detectingonebit).

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To obtain the empirical property of IP packet size for
the traffic within the Tor network, we downloaded a
file with the size of20M using the Tornetwork.
Fig.15shows the empirical cumulative probability
function (CDF) of the IP packet size in the traffic. As
shown in Fig. 5, we know that the packets with nonMTU size are around 50%. This validates that the
size of packets transmitted over the Tor is dynamic.
Consequently, it also indicates that our embedded
signal will be hidden in the normal traffic and hard to
be
detected
by
victims.
Tovalidatetheaccuracyofthecell-counting-

Detection rateversusdelay interval
andsignallengthwithdetection scheme1.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this project, we introduced a novel cell-countingbased attack against Tor. This attack is ifficult to
detect and is able to quickly and accurately confirm
the anonymous communication relationship among
users on Tor. An attacker at the malicious exit onion
router slightly manipulates the transmission of cells
from a target TCP stream and embeds a secret signal
(a series of binary bits) into the cell counter variation
of the TCP stream. An accomplice of the attacker at
the entry onion router recognizes the embedded
signal using our developed recovery algorithms and
links the communication relationship among users.
Our theoretical analysis shows that the detection rate
is a monotonously increasing function with respect to
the delay interval and is a monotonously decreasing
function of the variance of one way transmission
delay along a circuit. Via extensive real-world
experiments on Tor, the effectiveness and feasibility
of the attack is validated. Our data showed that this
attack could drastically and quickly degrade the
anonymity service that Tor provides. Due to Tor’s
fundamental design, defending against this attack
remains a very challenging task that we will
investigate in ourfuture research.

Detection rateversusdelayinterval
andsignallengthwithdetection scheme2(Note: Therateisfor
detectingonebit).
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